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Chapter III.4. The divergence between actual and estimated costs in large industrial and 
infrastructure projects: Is nuclear special?  
 
Large capital-intensive projects such as NPPs have had in recent years a poor record in 
delivering on budget and on time in most NEA and OECD countries. On the plus side, the nuclear 
industry has long been counting on the learning effects of building a series of given reactor 
types to bring costs down. Recently, however, researchers have questioned whether the costs for 
new build are increasing rather than decreasing (Grubler, 2010; Locatelli and Mancini, 2012). 
Assessing whether potential cost reductions from learning over the course of constructing 
several units are in fact outweighed by other factors such as increases in resource costs or 
regulatory uncertainty, is made difficult by the fact that there are relatively few projects 
from which to draw conclusions. Although there is a reasonable roll-out of broadly comparable 
generation II designs across the globe, there are substantial differences in the economic, 
political and regulatory environments in which plants are built. And the variations to 
standardised designs to allow for local regulatory conditions mean that there is limited 
experience in reality of building to standardised designs.  
Westinghouse believes that the experience of building PWRs in Korea between 1995 and 2005 shows 
reductions in both costs and construction times that are consistent with estimates that series 
build of a standard design can obtain cost reductions of around 30%. They attribute the cost 
savings to standardisation and also currency stability resulting from localisation of equipment 
supply (Matzie, 2005).  
Whether this experience can be replicated in western markets is subject to a wideranging 
debate. A study of the French nuclear programme, while considering it to be the most successful 
scaling-up of a complex, large-scale technology in the recent history of industrialised 
countries, examined the causes of cost escalation over the programme (Grubler, 2010: 5174-
5188). Despite the favourable institutional setting of centralised decision making and 
regulatory stability, the cost of PWR units constructed in the mid-1990s were considerably 
higher than those built at the beginning of the programme two decades earlier. The study 
considers that several intrinsic characteristics of nuclear construction, such as their size 
and complexity limit the opportunities to achieve cost improvements through the classical 
mechanisms of standardisation, large series and repetition of experience, i.e. economies of 
scale production over several reactors.  
Subsequent studies however pointed out that the Grubler study failed to distinguish between 
different series of reactors with sometimes considerable technical differences. At a recent 
workshop organised by the NEA, presenters both from AREVA and the French Ecole des Mines agreed 
that when comparing like with like, learning-by-doing and cost reductions do exist in the 
French nuclear industry (Jannet, 2014; Berthelemy and Escobar Rangel, 2013). When considering 
each technological series separately, the French nuclear programme thus achieved, according to 
AREVA, construction cost reductions between the first and last unit of each series that vary 
between 2% (CP0, 6 units) 26% (CP1, 18 units) with an average of 16% (calculations based on the 
widely recognised Cour des Comptes [2012] report).  
As far as more recent experience is concerned, construction at the EPR at Taishan (China) 
boasts a 60% reduction in engineering hours, a 50% reduction in months of civil work, a 40% 
reduction in the months of manufacturing of heavy components and a 30% reduction in months of 
welding of primary loop when compared to the EPR at Olkiluoto 3 (Finland). EDF reported similar 
progress between the construction of the EPR at Flamanville (France) and the Taishan project as 
the pouring of the raft of the nuclear island was reduced from 4.5 months to 1 month and 
putting the liner cup on the base slab from 47 to 10 weeks (see also the full case study on 
Flamanville 3, Taishan 1 and 2 and Hinkley Point C 1 and 2 in Section III.5.1).  
The reasons for these reductions lie both in technical improvement (one-batch pouring for the 
base slab, reduced steps for the pouring of the containment base) and organisational advances 
such as the reduction of management interfaces. A key question that was left unanswered is, of 
course, whether this impressive progress is a technological series effect or a country effect. 
The planned EPR at Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) is thus expected to have similar lead times 
but higher costs. This points towards the wider issue of how to account for learning-by-doing. 
Shall the series be constructed by technology (as do AREVA and EDF) country, company or even 
team? Research by the French Ecole des Mines for instance is based on companies and show that 
on average there is a 12% decrease in construction costs when moving from a FOAK reactor to a 
second reactor, with a FOAK premium varying between 10% and 40%. The main reasons are better 
co-ordinated supply chains and reduced risks of regulatory intervention. This gives a premium 
to less diversified nuclear fleets and the authors have calculated that a 10% decrease in the 
logarithmic HHI index of diversification will reduce costs by approximately 22%. The relevant 
metric might even be the team rather than the company. 
The IAEA Secretariat thus pointed out that the CANDU project at Quishan, for instance, one of 
the few major nuclear projects to be completed ahead of schedule, was built by a team that had 
immediately preceding experience with two other CANDU reactors (Moore, 2014). This stability of 
the teams was also a factor in the overall very satisfying construction performance of the 
ABWRs built at Shimane, Kashiwazaki and Hamaoka in Japan according to CH2MHill (Worker, 2014). 
Despite this encouraging evidence, the overall impression remains that nuclear projects are 
often delivered behind schedule and above budget to the extent that cost overruns and delays 
seem inevitable features of the industry. However, cost overruns for large and technically 
complex projects exist also in other industries. In fact, 70% of the costs of a nuclear reactor 
project are due to civil works, the conventional island and project management, with only 30% 
due to the nuclear island itself. And some conventional “megaprojects” do well, although cost 
overruns are typically larger in the energy industry (plus 80%) than in other industries 
according to the authors of the eponymous study. 
This begs the question “Is nuclear different?”, in particular from its peers in the energy 
industry such as the oil and gas industry. The latter needs also deal with multibillion energy 
projects in often difficult political and regulatory environments, although it may constitute a 
more homogenous industry at the global level, thus facilitating both competition and 
benchmarking. Arguably, the oil and gas industry is also submitted to a level of public 
scrutiny that is comparable to that of nuclear, at least as far as its operating performance in 
NEA and OECD countries is concerned. This has led the IAEA to conclude that while series for 
individual reactors types are typically small, nine out of ten issues in nuclear new build 
remain the same as in other industries. What can the nuclear industry learn then from other 
industries, whether the oil and gas industry, the aerospace, the automotive or the logistics 
industry? One area is project management and logistics. EDF has thus hired as a project manager 
for its reactor project at Hinkley Point the person who was responsible for the London Olympics 
as these were widely regarded as a logistical and financial success. The complete traceability 
of components for more efficient delivery, installation and eventual replacement is another 
area where the nuclear industry can learn from other industries. Benchmarking and the pooling 
of industry experience (see the section on project management) is a third area. 
Overall, the distinct impression has emerged from discussions that the global nuclear industry 
is slowly becoming more “normal”, in the sense of having to deal with the challenges of new 
build under conditions very similar to those of its peers. While a “special” status might 
have protected national nuclear champions from economic efficiency pressures in the past, today 
cost concerns rather than safety concerns are driving change in the nuclear industry. In this, 
the nuclear industry is already very similar to its peers. The next section will look at this 
question in the particular context of the EU megaproject programme. 
 
 III.4.1. The overall performance of megaprojects1 
A megaproject (sometimes called a large or major project) is an extremely large-scale physical 
investment project of at least USD 1 billion and having considerable impacts on communities, 
the environment and shareholder value. They include: • civil infrastructure projects such as 
railway lines, bridges, tunnels or airports; • oil and gas projects such as refineries, 
pipelines or liquefied natural gas plants; • power plants, in particular NPPs. 
More often than not, megaprojects are characterised by cost overruns and delays. Several 
scholars have attempted to identify the reasons for such dismal performance. Bend Flyvbjerg and 
his group have thus studied megaproject performance in the transportation sector (Flyvbjerg, 
2006) and Cantarelli has analysed 806 large projects benchmarking the performance of Dutch 
infrastructure vs. the rest of the world (Cantarelli et al., 2012). A study by Ansar relied on 
a database of 245 large dams, built between 1934 and 2007 on five continents (Ansar et al., 
2014), while 318 megaprojects distributed all around the world costing more than USD 1 billion 
was the database used by Merrow (2011). 
A common conclusion of these studies is that large infrastructure projects are characterised by 
large cost overruns. Flyvbjerg thus shows an average budget overrun of 44.7% for rail, 33.8% 
for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Cantarelli reports mean cost overruns of 19.8%, 
34.1%, 30% and 35.5% for road, rail, bridge and tunnel projects, respectively. For dams, three 
out of every four large dams suffered cost overruns and actual costs were on average 96% higher 
than estimated costs with a median value of 27%. The Ansar study also shows that large dams 
take significantly longer than planners forecast. About 80% of the projects suffered a schedule 
overrun and construction times were on average about 44% (corresponding to two years and four 
months) higher than the estimate. An important conclusion from these analyses is that the 
accuracy of predictions, whether for cost estimates, construction schedules or even road and 
rail traffic forecasts, has not improved over time. Whether due to the bias introduced by 
tendering procedures or due to the inherent complexities of megaprojects, there is apparently 
little learning from past mistakes. 
Ansar’s research also suggests that there is no correlation between regions and cost or 
schedule overruns. Large dams built in every region of the world suffer systematic cost and 
schedule overruns. The analysis by Merrow shows a strong dichotomy: few projects are very 
successful, several unsuccessful. The 35% of the projects that succeeded were genuinely 
excellent projects. On average, they underran their budgets by 2% while delivering highly 
competitive (96% of industry average) costs. They were completed on time with schedules that 
were only slightly (4%) slower than the long-term industry average. Their average production 
was well ahead of the plan. By contrast, the failures are truly miserable projects: they 
averaged a 40% constant currency overrun while being very expensive in absolute terms. They 
slipped their execution schedules by an average of 28% while being 15% slower than a 
competitive schedule. (Merrow, 2011) 
Thus far, research on analysing and comparing nuclear projects with other large infrastructure 
projects is limited to the work by Mancini, Locatelli and Sainati (n.d.) on “The Effective 
                                                          
1 This next two sections are based on a synthesis of Locatelli and Mancini (2010), Locatelli and Mancini 
(2012) and Locatelli et al. (2014a and 2014b), as well as on the results of the unpublished study for E-
COST “The Effective Design and Delivery of Megaprojects in the European Union” by Mauro Mancini, Giorgio 
Locatelli and Tristano Sainati. 
Design and Delivery of Megaprojects in the European Union”, that is based on a network of 
about 80 researchers from more than 20 European countries. Their dataset is composed of 43 
megaprojects including 20 transportation megaprojects and 12 energy projects, of which 4 are 
nuclear. The latter include the EPR new build projects Olkiluoto 3 (Finland) and Flamanville 3 
(France), the completion of the Mohovce 3 and 4 units (Slovakia), and the upgrade of the 
reactors in Oskarshamn (Sweden). The overall picture is consistent with the results reported by 
Flyvbjerg and Merrow: megaprojects in Europe tend to be over budget and late. Although the 
nuclear database consists only of a very limited number of cases and all of them can be 
considered as FOAK projects, results show the budget overrun of nuclear projects even exceeds 
the overruns of other large infrastructure projects. 
Reasons for cost and budget overruns in megaprojects  
In explaining the budget overruns and delays in the delivery of megaprojects, the project 
technology (NPPs apart), location and construction date have little influence. There are, 
however a number of recurring features that are identified by different researchers. 
Optimism bias and strategic manipulation  
Wachs interviewed government officials, consultants and planners in charge of different 
projects and noted that their estimations were biased (Wachs, 1990). They manipulated forecasts 
to achieve values that were not justified in technical terms, but acceptable for their 
superiors to be able to implement the project. Cognitive biases and organisational pressures 
push managers to provide optimistic forecasts. Flyvbjerg (2006) adds optimism bias inducing 
promoters to consider each assumption positively. The authors point out, however, that such 
optimism is misleading for the promoters themselves, and not an intentional error. 
Stakeholders mistakes and project characteristics  
Merrow (2011) identifies seven “key mistakes” and provides a statistical analysis of the 
correlations between project characteristics and project performance. The seven “key mistakes
” made by the key megaprojects stakeholders are: greed, schedule pressure, poor bidding phase, 
reductions in upfront cost, poor engineering and design, unrealistic cost estimations and poor 
risk allocation. Regarding the statistical analysis, the author also shows that the following 
parameters have strong correlations with project performance: regulatory climate and stability, 
clear and coherent business objectives, quality and reliability of basic data, radical new 
technology, project team characteristics, quality of the front-end loading, engineering and 
design, remoteness of site, contractual forms, incentives, supportiveness of government, risk 
management, labour availability and project governance. 
 
 Project governance  
Focusing on the governance of megaprojects, van Marrewijk et al. (2008) argue that the failures 
of megaprojects are also promoted by scope ambiguity, technical complexity and the involvement 
of a large number of partners with different cultures and different ways of working. According 
to the authors, it is possible to improve project performance through better governance and a 
better definition of the responsibilities of the key stakeholders involved. In particular, they 
refer to the so-called “control versus commitment dilemma”. When the project organisation 
exercises dominant control, the partners lose commitment to the project. They feel that they do 
not have autonomy to make decisions and consider their role focused only on accomplishing the 
tasks they are in charge of. However, commitment is fundamental to achieve success, so it is 
necessary to find an optimal compromise between control and freedom. 
Intrinsic complexity  
Another research stream explains the cost overruns and delays of megaprojects by way of their 
intrinsic complexity and the complexity of the environment in which they are delivered. 
Compared to a “simple project” (e.g. a primary school building), megaprojects are often 
delivered in a project environment characterised by: • rapid technological change and increased 
risks of obsolescence; • interoperable and interdependent systems; • emphasis on cost reduction; 
• tight schedules without quality or scope reduction; • integration issues as a high number of 
system parts, and organisations involved; • combining multiple technical disciplines; • 
competitive pressures. These seven elements are typical of “complex project environments”. 
Another metric defines a project environment as “complex” if it has at least one of the 
following characteristics: • several distinct disciplines, methods or approaches involved in 
the project; • strong legal, social, or environmental impacts of the project; • the use of a 
high share of a partner’s resources (absence of redundancy); • strategic importance of the 
project to the organisation or organisations involved; • stakeholders with conflicting needs 
regarding the characteristics of the project; • a high number and variety of interfaces between 
the project and other organisational entities. It is clear that these parameters often apply to 
megaprojects, in particular the construction of NPPs. 
 III.4.2. New nuclear power plants as megaprojects  
Quite obviously, the construction of a new NPP is a megaproject. A typical generation III/III+ 
reactor will use 6 000 m3 of concrete only for the base-mat, 61 000 tonnes of steel and 4 000 
tonnes of forgings. To this must be added 5 000 valves, 200 pumps, 210 km of piping, more than 
2 000 km of cabling and more than 50 000 welding seams. However, there are other large 
industrial projects. In this perspective, does nuclear remain special? 
Assessing cost reductions and the ability of the nuclear industry to keep up with its peers 
over time remains a work in progress. Representatives of the EU funded Megaproject research 
study, who study cost and time performance of a large number of sizeable industrial projects, 
even dispute on the basis of their statistics that FOAK is a relevant metric. One must also be 
cautious with ascribing all observable impacts to the internal economies or diseconomies of the 
reactor builder. As pointed out by Vanbrugh consulting, reactor costs really did come down 
during the 1990s in many countries. As far as the subsequent cost increases during the first 
decade of the 21st century are concerned, external factors such as increases in the price of 
steel, specialised labour and energy played a significant role. Not everything can be 
controlled. Only two thirds of the costs can be considered as firm at the time of signing the 
contract; the rest is variable. Fortunately, external influences can go either way. The US DOE 
thus reported that current outlays at the AP1000 project at the VC Summer plant in South 
Carolina are below projections due to lower than expected financing costs. The current cost of 
debt is thus 5.7% on average, with a latest tranche of USD 400 million having been placed at 
4.6% in June 2013, more than compensating a slight increase in overnight costs. The industry 
also no longer experiences serious bottlenecks in key components. Even in the area of highvalue 
segment of large forgings such as the reactor vessel, global supply is currently sufficient, 
with Japan alone being able to satisfy three quarters of global demand. The research of 
Flyvbjerg, Merrow and the Megaproject group mentioned above, however, suggests that cost 
escalation in the nuclear sector might be even higher than elsewhere, in particular looking at 
the two new European projects Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3. On the other hand, the history of 
the Korean nuclear programme until its recent brush with quality control issues can be 
considered an unqualified success. Nuclear programmes seem to display a dichotomy of 
performance that is stronger than with other type of megaprojects. 
Several factors make the projects of building new nuclear reactors unique. Comparing the 
construction of nuclear reactors with other megaproject (e.g. a new defence system or an 
international high-speed railway) point to a number of peculiarities, including: • The “safety 
issue”. A failure/accident in a solar, wind or even coal plant has very local “short-term” 
consequences, while a nuclear accident can cause a major disaster with a long time-scale. The 
design and construction of safe reactors is possible, but requires very high quality standards. 
They also require extreme specialisation with bottlenecks in particular for FOAK projects. 
• The variety of disciplines and provenance of the workforce. The design and construction of an 
NPP include virtually all kinds of hard engineering skills (from civil to mechanics) and 
managerial skills (finance, project management, health and safety). Moreover, the design and 
construction involves thousands of people from multiple countries on the site. The blend of 
disciplines, cultures, languages (and even standards and certifications) represents an 
extraordinary challenge for organisation. This was a critical aspect at Olkiluoto 3. 
• Stakeholder scrutiny. Compared to a large offshore wind farm, the construction of an NPP will 
attract much more attention from safety authorities, but also the press, political or 
environmental groups. 
The following section focuses on the cost and schedule performance of NPPs. It provides three 
case studies of nuclear new build at Shoreham (United States), Olkiluoto and Flamanville 
(Finland and France) and in Korea, and discusses the key lessons learnt. 
 Shoreham nuclear power plant  
The Shoreham NNP was a 820 MW BWR located adjacent to the Long Island Sound in East Shoreham, 
New York. The plant was built between 1973 and 1984, commissioned, but never operated. The cost 
famously escalated from USD 75 million to USD 5.5 billion, a factor of roughly 70. Ross and 
Staw (1993) identify some of the reasons behind this spectacular cost overrun: 
• Objective difficulty to estimate the real cost of such a complex and innovative project, in 
particular as scope creep set in due to legislation changes. 
• Sunk cost trap: cost estimates rose exponentially during the project. The US dollar value of 
each increase was a relatively small percentage of previous expenditures. In addition, most of 
the expenditures took place when the plant was already 80% completed. Having a nearly completed 
physical structure probably increased the willingness to invest additional funds. 
• Investment lock-in: greater and greater percentage of owner and bank capitals were tied to 
Shoreham, the plant and the future of the utility became intertwined. The project turned into a 
“bet-the-company” proposition. 
• Psychological determinants included optimism bias, “winner will always win” attitude and a 
blame culture in which abandoning the project would be shameful for the project team. 
• Social determinants may have included cultural factors such as the fact that American society 
reserves special praise for those who stay a course in the face of hardship, or mimetic 
behaviour: the company that owned Shoreham was one of the few major utilities in the United 
States not to have a nuclear power component. They wanted an NPP. 
• Organisational determinants: the decision to embark on the construction of an NPP mainly 
involved people whose primary asset was expertise with nuclear power. Increasingly, the company 
placed all its hopes in the nuclear basket. 
• Contextual determinants: The decision to construct a nuclear plant became larger than the 
organisation itself, involving forces beyond the organisation’s boundaries, such as political 
supporters. The role of these external parties and their alliances with the owner cannot be 
overemphasised. 
 
European new build: Olkiluoto and Flamanville 
Locatelli and Mancini focus their analysis on the EPR new build projects Olkiluoto 3 and 
Flamanville 3 (Locatelli and Mancini, 2012). By examining Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 for 
points of similarity, it is possible to posit that the causes of cost over budget and delay can 
be grouped into the two meta-themes of: (i) FOAK effects in a highly regulated environment; and 
(ii) over-optimistic forecasts. 
 
FOAK effects for megaprojects 
It may seem strange to define two EPR construction projects using the same technology of FOAK 
projects. However, even if the technologies are the same, the two projects are executed by 
separate supply chains, parts of which were unfamiliar with the regulatory context, and each 
one of which experienced its own significant FOAK issues. In nuclear engineering projects, the 
architect/engineer plays a key role in the performance of a project particularly in terms of 
managing project information. In the case of Olkiluoto 3, AREVA was, for the first time, the 
architect/engineer of a nuclear construction project. In the case of Flamanville 3, EDF has a 
long history of having built and commissioned 44 GW of nuclear capacity. The last unit built in 
France however started commercial operations in 2002, although construction had been completed 
in 1999. The EPR is a new technology and caused many FOAK issues even for an experienced 
architect/engineer such as EDF. Furthermore, EDF used a new and untested supplier network. FOAK 
effects in the supply chain were thus in evidence in both cases. In Flamanville 3 and in 
Olkiluoto 3, the regulatory authorities (the Nuclear Safety Authority [ASN] and Finnish 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority [STUK] respectively) held up construction because of the 
insufficient quality of the work undertaken by inexperienced contractors (Ruuska et al., 2009). 
 
Over-optimistic forecasts 
 In both projects, the original estimates were significantly below the actual time and 
resources required. Grubler argues that the initial 2005 forecast for the EPR at Flamanville 
was too optimistic if compared to the previous costs of reactors built in France, in particular 
considering that an increase in size increases construction time, and the EPR is the largest 
reactor ever built. Moreover, the EPR is based both on the German Konvoi reactor and the French 
N4 reactor. Already, building the N4 reactor had proven difficult as it faced numerous 
technical difficulties, substantial delays, and by French standards, significant cost overruns. 
Looking at the values for the N4 reactor in Table 29 and in Figure 41, it becomes clear that 
the initial forecasts were too optimistic. The previous reference reactors had been completed 
in about ten years during an era in which dozens of reactors had been built, when the entire 
project delivery chain was experienced and FOAK effects had been minimised. 
 The new EPRs are bigger, more complex and built by inexperienced supply chains. Nevertheless, 
the initial estimation forecasted a 50% reduction in the construction schedule. The forecasts 
for both Flamanville 3 and Olkiluoto 3 clearly demonstrated optimism bias. EDF Energy (a UK 
company owned by EDF) has now advanced plans for the construction of two EPRs in Hinkley Point 
(Somerset, England). EDF Energy applied for consent to construct and operate the two EPRs in 
October 2011. In October 2013, the government announced that initial agreement had been reached 
with EDF Energy on the key terms of a proposed GBP 16 billion investment contract for the 
Hinkley Point C nuclear power station. The sum of GBP 16 billion corresponds to EUR 20 billion, 
a number not very far from the current and possibly final estimates for the total combined 
costs of Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3. The new cost estimates are thus consistent with a “
reference class forecast” approach. 
   
The Korean experience 
Nuclear experts agree that the (pre-2000) French and Korean NNB programmes are success stories. 
In both countries, a cohesive group of organisations constituted the project delivery chain 
and, after the definition of a standard design, successfully delivered several power plants. 
These countries established network relationships to deliver a “nuclear programme” (i.e. 
several, almost identical, reactors) rather than individually commissioned power plants. Most 
of the time, the architect/engineer and the subcontractors were able to deliver the reactors on 
time and on budget, the French N4 reactors being an exception. 
 In large projects, especially in the nuclear field, a key strategy to achieve good 
performances appears to be the standardisation of the project delivery supply chain and reactor 
design (Locatelli et al., 2014b). This is an insight that applies well to the Korean new build 
programme. Figure 42 shows the very good performance in terms of construction times of the 
Korean nuclear programme (IAEA, 2014). 
In addition to standardisation, Choi, et al. (2009) summarise a number of lessons to explain 
the success of the Korean experience: 
• integration of extensive knowledge and experiences; 
• strong national commitment to the nuclear power programme; 
• continuous investment in the infrastructure with government leadership; 
• localisation through technology transfer (as discussed above); 
• clear definition of responsibilities and rights in the NPP construction. 
 
  
Concluding considerations on delivering successful megaprojects 
 In order to enable the realisation of complex systems, such as an NNB project in 
multidimensional environments, multidisciplinary approaches such as system engineering are 
required. The latter provides a somewhat broader approach to classic project management and 
includes aspects such as shared leadership, social competence and emotional intelligence, 
communication, skills in organisational politics and the recognition of the importance of 
visions, and values. The modern origins of system engineering can be traced to the 1930s, but 
the first significant developments were in the early 1950s when the US Department of Defence 
needed to deliver large, complex projects respecting time, budget and quality. 
To achieve these ambitious targets, standard project governance was no longer enough and “
project governance” had to evolve into “system governance”. The focus of system engineering 
is in particular on the earlier project stages. These stages are the project definition (scope 
management), project stakeholder management and project planning (all aspects related to the 
project governance). These are key aspects in the nuclear field, and include the decision on 
the reactor size (a multidimensional problem requiring the evaluation of several aspects), the 
definition of the best supply chain configuration for the local culture and political 
configuration (including all external stakeholders), or the realistic overall plan without 
biases from personal or ideological interests. 
The nuclear sector presents the highest level of technical complexity compared to other 
industrial sectors such as oil and gas, pharmaceuticals or food manufacturing, which makes 
paying attention to managerial topics particularly important. When analysing both the past 
performance of nuclear projects and nuclear incidents, most of them can be traced back to 
managerial mistakes, not to technical ones. In the past, these considerations were addressed by 
giving managerial positions in the nuclear delivery chain to very good managers coming from 
other sectors. However, the peculiarities of the nuclear industry cannot be fully appreciated 
with just theoretical training. On-hand experience remains a fundamental asset. a long-term 
objective, even if it is not a simple and quick process. The managerial evolution of the 
military and aerospace supply chain can be considered as a benchmark, since they are from an 
organisational point of view comparable to the nuclear industry. However, very clearly there is 
no magic bullet. Megaprojects are frequently over budget and late all over the world in many 
different sectors. There has been little or no improvement over the decades. Project 
performance today is roughly similar to ten, twenty and thirty years ago. On the other hand, 
even if public opinion and the press are focusing on nuclear projects being over budget and 
late, such poor performance is not a fatality. The Korean and the (pre-2000) French experience 
shows that it is possible to deliver nuclear projects on time and budget. Key success factors 
are the replication of existing reactors, a relative monoculture, a stable environment with 
experienced stakeholders and a long-term view. Some of these factors may no longer be 
replicable and the most promising way forward may be to start learning from other high 
technological sectors such as aerospace or oil and gas, where a number of major companies have 
evolved from national champions to global competitors. 
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